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ABSTRACT

Beyond question, medical diagnostic tests, they save lives. The
diagnostic tests also contribute to the overall health of the U.S. economy.
However, the current state of subject-matter eligibility for patent
protection does not incentivize the research and development of these lifesaving tools. Previous legislative and judicial efforts to fix subject-matter
eligibility have failed. This article proposes a diagnostic patent act to
allow the protection of in vitro diagnostic tests. The proposed diagnostic
patent act would include safeguards to allow adequate access to
fundamental research while incentivizing the return of investment to the
patent holder. Safeguards would include exceptions to patent
infringement claims and compulsory licensing requirements under certain
conditions. Exceptions, which limit infringement liability to third parties
in specific situations, would be used for narrow experimental use and
mandatory processes required to comply with federal regulations.
Compulsory licensing, which requires patent holders to allow third
parties to use a patent in certain circumstances in exchange for a
determined fee, would be permitted when the patent holder acts in an anticompetitive way and for governmental or public health uses. The
combination of these limitations on a patent holder’s exclusive monopoly
will ensure that access to research is available while patent holders are
adequately incentivized to develop innovative diagnostic tests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2009, Alison, a four-year old girl, was diagnosed with
myasthenia gravis. 1 Myasthenia gravis (MG) is a chronic autoimmune
neuromuscular disorder that causes varying degrees of weakness in the
voluntary skeletal muscles.2 In hindsight, Alison’s symptoms were typical
of MG, but at the time, Alison’s symptoms weren’t anything out of
ordinary by themselves. 3 Alison stopped drinking from her sippy cup. She
couldn’t blow out her birthday candles. Sometimes she and her twin
brother would laugh when milk came out of her nose. Her voice was
quieter and her smile seemed wrong. When Alison couldn’t drink her
favorite treat, a Slurpee, out of a straw in light of her other symptoms,
Alison’s mom knew something was wrong and sought medical advice. 4
At first, Alison’s condition puzzled many doctors. Diagnosing MG
is a difficult task and is often delayed months, or even years because MG
has multiple mechanism types that exhibit an array of symptoms that can
be confused with other diseases. 5 Diagnosing MG generally requires
multiple tests to eliminate similar diseases that manifest similar
symptoms. 6 After ruling out numerous conditions through various
diagnostic testing, a neurologist hypothesized that Alison had MG. 7 In
Alison’s case, she underwent a variety of tests and treatments to confirm
the MG hypothesis.
The next task was to determine how best to treat her. 8 At the time of
Alison’s diagnosis, medical professionals around the world disagreed
with how to treat MG. 9 This, in part, is due to the complex mechanisms
of the disease, the different antibodies involved in various types of MG,
and the fluctuation of symptoms.
Typically, MG is characterized by the presence of antibodies that
attack the acetylcholine (ACh) receptor, which in turn inhibits control of
skeletal muscles. Approximately 85 percent of patients with MG test
positive for ACh antibodies. An additional 5–7 percent of the patient
1. Telephone Interview with Aurelie Pahnke (Sept. 24, 2019).
2. MG Quick Facts, MYASTHENIA GRAVIS FOUND. OF AM., https://myasthenia.org/What-isMG/MG-Quick-Facts [https://perma.cc/6EX7-W99W].
3. Telephone Interview with Aurelie Pahnke (Sept. 24, 2019).
4. Id.
5. MG Quick Facts, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Telephone Interview with Aurelie Pahnke (Sept. 24, 2019).
8. Id.
9. James F. Howard, Jr., Clinical Overview of MG, MYASTHENIA GRAVIS FOUND. OF AM.,
https://myasthenia.org/For-Professionals/Clinical-Overview-of-MG [https://perma.cc/2CF2-827K]
(describing the three-year effort to develop guidelines that were published in 2016).
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population has the presence of muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK)
antibodies. The remaining patient population of about 7–8 percent have
neither antibody. 10 In order for doctors to make an informed decision for
the best possible treatment, doctors needed to know what type of MG
Alison had by confirming what type of antibody was present in her
blood. 11
Before 2001, the scientific community was aware of the connection
between ACh antibodies and MG, but not of the connection between MG
and the MuSK antibodies. 12 Then in 2001, Athena Diagnostics submitted
a patent application for “neurotransmission disorders,” disclosing a
“method for diagnosing neurotransmission or developmental
disorders . . . [by] detecting . . . the muscle specific tyrosine kinase
(MuSK).” 13 Athena Diagnostics had discovered that MuSK was
associated with MG. Athena Diagnostics subsequently developed a blood
assay to detect the MuSK molecule allowing medical providers to more
accurately diagnosis and treat patients with MG. 14 Prior to Athena
Diagnostic’s invention, no one had ever used MuSK to diagnose the 5–7
percent of the MG patient population. After six years of patent
prosecution, U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 was granted to Athena
Diagnostics in 2007. 15
Timing was on Alison’s side. With the newly developed diagnostic
test of MG, Alison’s team was able to determine which antibodies were
present or absent. In turn, her team created an individualized treatment
plan. 16 Today, Alison is in remission and has no symptoms of MG.
The same diagnostic test that allowed Alison to receive the correct
treatment was held to be subject-matter ineligible and subsequently
invalidated by the courts in 2019. 17 This has not been the only diagnostic

10. Id.
11. Autoimmune MG and Diagnostic Tests, MYASTHENIA GRAVIS FOUND. OF AM.,
https://myasthenia.org/What-is-MG/MG-and-Related-Disorders/Autoimmune-MG-and-DiagnosticTests [https://perma.cc/Y596-Z5QB].
12. Brief of the Biotechnology Innovation Org., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants’
Petition for Rehearing en banc at 10, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC,
927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2508), 2019 WL 1894542.
13. Neurotransmission Disorders, U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 col. 1 l. 58–62 (filed June 15,
2001) (issued Sept. 11, 2007).
14. Telephone Interview with Aurelie Pahnke (Sept. 24, 2019).
15. ’820 Patent.
16. Telephone Interview with Aurelie Pahnke (Sept. 24, 2019).
17. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 275 F. Supp. 3d 306 (D.
Mass. 2017), aff’d 915 F.3d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 2019), en banc reh’g denied, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
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test invalidated due to subject-matter ineligibility in recent years. 18 Since
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. in 2014,
the courts have invalidated numerous life-saving diagnostic tests. 19 Every
time a patent is invalidated, it negatively affects millions of people and
burdens the international and national economy. 20
In May 2019, the Senate Judiciary Committee IP Subcommittee
released draft legislation with the objective to fix subject-matter
eligibility, which affects the patent protection for diagnostic tests. 21
However, the draft legislation, which abrogated all judicial exceptions,
did not find majority support among the various public opinions because
of the vast breadth of subject-matter eligibility across diverse industries.22
While there is a widespread outcry for a fix of the subject-matter
eligibility as a whole, this note will focus on solutions for in vitro
diagnostic (IVD) testing patents. 23
18. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1352 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Since Mayo, we
have held every single diagnostic claim in every case before us ineligible.”). See also Athena
Diagnostics, Inc., 915 F.3d 743 (invalidating method of diagnosing a neurological disorder); Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (invalidating method for detecting
pathogenic bacterium); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(invalidating methods for detecting a coding region of DNA based on its relationship to non-coding
regions); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(invalidating methods for detecting paternally inherited cffDNA in the blood or serum of a pregnant
female); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 761
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating methods for screening for an altered BRCA1 gene).
19. The Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012) (setting forth a two-step framework for determining subject-matter eligibility, the first being
a requirement that the technology be patentable). Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1352 (Moore,
J., dissenting) (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim in every case before us
ineligible.”).
20. See infra Part II.
21. Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release
Section 101 Patent Reform Framework, THOM TILLIS U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C. (Apr. 17, 2019)
[hereinafter 101 Framework], https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-repscollins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework [https://perma.cc/6NGWX5M7].
22. Gene Quinn, Time to Wake Up: Stakeholders Must Compromise to Save the U.S. Patent
System, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/29/time-wakestakeholders-must-compromise-save-u-s-patent-system/id=118362/ [https://perma.cc/4KBG-5SVU].
23. Diagnostic testing comes in a variety of forms. In vivo testing occurs outside of the body.
In contrast, in vitro testing which occurs inside the body. This note will focus on in vitro diagnostics,
or diagnostics performed outside the body. In vitro tests are used for the examination of specimens
derived from the human body to provide information for screening, diagnosis, or treatment monitoring
purposes. Laboratory and In Vitro Diagnostics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/in-vitrodiagnostic/en/ [https://perma.cc/732S-XXZF]. Examples of in vitro testing includes, but is not limited
to molecular diagnosis, point of care, and clinical chemistry. Molecular diagnosis refers to the
detection of variants on DNA and genetic materials. S.A. TURNER & G.J. TSONGALIS, DIAGNOSTIC
MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY: A GUIDE TO APPLIED MOLECULAR TESTING ch. 4 (Academic Press, 2016);
Point of care testing refers to diagnostic testing that is done in minutes with the patient. Point of Care
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To protect IVD patents, Congress must find legislative middle
ground that preserves the spirit and objectives of the patent system.
Congress must create separate special patentability requirements for IVD
patents that balance return on investment against access to the tools
necessary for scientific advancements.
To define an appropriate middle ground, this note will first provide
an overview of the importance of IVD testing, and then a background of
the current state of subject-matter eligibility through a review of the major
Supreme Court cases that affect the patentability of IVD testing. Next, this
note will discuss why Congress is in the best position to create legislation
to protect IVD testing by reviewing the unsuccessful efforts of the
USPTO, discussing the divide of the Federal Circuit, and reviewing the
ill-conceived solution of the Senate IP Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Finally, this note will propose an alternative
legislative framework for IVD patents that maintains the spirit and
purpose of the patent system by balancing access to technologies with
return on investment. In short, the proposed legislative framework will
create a separate diagnostic patent act that imposes infringement
exceptions and conditions of compulsory licensing for those granted an
IVD patent. In the end, this note will show that Congress must carve out
a separate diagnostic patent act to preserve the economic mechanism
needed for diagnostics to develop and save the lives of millions of
individuals.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTING
As the case of Alison shows, the importance of diagnostic testing
cannot be understated. 24 “An accurate diagnosis is the first step to getting
effective treatment.” 25 About 66 percent of clinical decisions rely on IVD

Testing, ABBOTT, https://www.pointofcare.abbott/us/en/about-us/benefits-of-point-of-care-testing
[https://perma.cc/R7T8-3WWS]; Clinical chemistry measures specific concentrations or activities of
substances in the body. A common example would be drug testing, or glucose tests. See ROBERTA
REED, LEARNING GUIDE: CLINICAL CHEMISTRY (Abbott 2020), https://www.corelaboratory.abbott/
sal/learningGuide/ADD-00061345_ClinChem_Learning_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CU86XCY2].
24. Laboratory and In Vitro Diagnostics, supra note 23 (“IVDs are essential to improve health
outcomes, and are critical tools both in everyday medical practice and in emergencies.”).
25. Press Release, World Health Org., First-Ever WHO List of Essential Diagnostic Tests to
Improve Diagnosis and Treatment Outcomes (May 15, 2018) [hereinafter Essential diagnostics],
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/15-05-2018-first-ever-who-list-of-essential-diagnostic-teststo-improve-diagnosis-and-treatment-outcomes [https://perma.cc/7CYE-3YJ2].
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tests according to a 2016 report. 26 IVD tests are the tools in which
clinicians in all areas of medicine examine specimens from the body to
provide information for screening, diagnosis, or treatment monitoring
purposes. IVD tests include simple cotton swaps, testing blood or tissue
to sequencing DNA to identify mutations. With an accurate diagnosis,
patients receive correct treatments and are protected from incorrect,
potentially harmful treatments and unnecessary healthcare costs
associated with erroneous treatments. 27
Early detection of chronic diseases with IVD tests produces better
patient outcomes, saves lives, and saves costs at a later, more expensive
stage of care. 28 For example, in the U.S., 90 percent of 3.5 trillion in
annual health care expenditures are for people with chronic or mental
health conditions. 29 The World Health Organization (“WHO”) estimates
that 46 percent of adults with type 2 diabetes worldwide are
undiagnosed. 30 In the U.S., more that 30 million Americans have diabetes,
and another 84 million adults have prediabetes, a risk factor for type 2
diabetes. 31 Diabetes in turn leads to higher costs for health complications
and long-term care. 32 The Center for Disease Control estimates that
diabetes alone costs the U.S. health care system and employers $327
billion every year. 33 Diagnostic testing can mitigate those costs on the
economy and provide better quality of life for individuals.
Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of WHO
said, “No one should suffer or die because of a lack of diagnostic services,
or because the right tests were not available.” 34 Yet since 2014, the courts
are invalidating IVD tests as subject-matter ineligible. 35 The diagnostic
test that allowed Alison to receive the correct treatment was invalidated
26. Sanjeev Mahanta, Patent Eligibility of Medical Diagnostic Inventions: Where Are We Now,
and Where Are We Headed?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2019/04/14/patent-eligibility-of-medical-diagnostics-inventions-where-are-we-now-and-where-isthere-to-go/id=108263/ [https://perma.cc/C3B6-ZX4V]; Laboratory and In Vitro Diagnostics, supra
note 23.
27. Essential diagnostics, supra note 25.
28. Laboratory and In Vitro Diagnostics, supra note 23.
29. Health and Economic Costs of Chronic Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/about/costs/index.htm [https://perma.cc/FR45ALXL].
30. Essential diagnostics, supra note 25.
31. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 29.
32. Id. (“Diabetes can cause heart disease, kidney failure, and blindness . . . .”).
33. Id.
34. Essential diagnostics, supra note 25.
35. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1352 (Moore,
J., dissenting) (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim in every case before us
ineligible.”).
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by the courts in 2019. 36 A test assessing the risk of cardiovascular disease
and early diagnosis was invalidated in 2014. 37 Cardiovascular disease
accounts for one-third of all deaths in the U.S. every year and costs the
healthcare system $214 billion per year and $138 billion in lost
productivity on the job. 38 A diagnostic test screening for altered genes,
linked to hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, was invalidated in 2014. 39
Cancer causes almost 600,000 deaths every year and is estimated to cost
174 billion by 2020. 40 A test for detecting tuberculosis was invalidated in
2018. 41 Tuberculosis affects around 10 million worldwide; 1.5 million
people die from tuberculosis annually. 42
While diagnostic testing is critical for the health of individuals and
the economy, the current state of patent law has created obstacles in
protecting and accessing capital in the industry. 43 Globally, the IVD
industry was worth about 40–45 billion dollars in 2018. 44 In the United
States, the diagnostic industry is estimated to be worth 19 billion dollars.45
The global diagnostic industry is expected to grow 5.2 percent from 2019
to 2024. 46
The patent system was meant to incentivize investments for the
commercialization of new technologies by allowing a limited monopoly

36. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 275 F. Supp.3d 306 (D. Mass.
2017), aff’d 915 F.3d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and en banc reh’g denied, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
37. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
38. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 29.
39. In re BRCA1-& BRACA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
40. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 29.
41. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
42. Tuberculosis, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/tuberculosis [https://perma.cc/SV7Y-3B4E].
43. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Patent Eligibility in
America, Part I] (questions for the record for Mr. Robert A. Armitage from Senator Blumenthal,
Consultant, IP Strategy and Consultant).
44. THE EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS AND POLICIES, ENSURING
INNOVATION IN DIAGNOSTICS FOR BACTERIAL INFECTION 13 (Chantal Morel et al. eds., 2016).
45. Id. Europe, Japan, and the United States account for 80 percent of the diagnostic market.
Europe contributes 14 billion annually, while Japan’s market is valued at 4 billion annually.
46. Press Release, MarketWatch, Clinical Diagnostic Market 2019 Global Industry; Trends,
Share, Size, Demand, Growth Opportunities, Industry Revenue, Future and Business Analysis by
Forecast - 2023 (July 11, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/clinical-diagnosticmarket-2019-global-industry-trends-share-size-demand-growth-opportunities-industry-revenuefuture-and-business-analysis-by-forecast-2023-2019-07-11 [https://perma.cc/4AJV-V2QQ].
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for a limited term. 47 Without an objective, predictable patent system, the
industry will not receive the adequate investments necessary to allow
growth in the IVD industry, and ultimately create the life-saving
technologies that are desperately needed.48
The development and commercialization of a single diagnostic test
costs between $20.1 million to $106 million dollars and often takes around
10 years. 49 Many times, research encounters a dead end before marketready technology is fully developed. 50 Without investments,
advancements in technologies will be slowed. 51 Investors are reluctant to
invest when the patent system, charged with giving a return on
investment, is riddled with uncertainty. Henry Hadad, President of the
Intellectual Property Owners Association, testified that “[c]onfusion
about what is patent-eligible discourages inventors from pursuing work in
certain [R&D intensive] technology areas, including discovering new
genetic biomarkers and developing diagnostic . . . technologies. For
businesses, uncertainty disincentivizes the enormous investment in
research and development . . . .” 52
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY FOR
DIAGNOSTIC TESTING
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
47. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44 (questions for the record for Mr. Robert
A. Armitage from Senator Blumenthal, Consultant, IP Strategy and Consultant) (“The prime
justification for the patent system is that it provides incentives that are essential for securing
investments required to develop and commercialize new technology.”).
48. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part II Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Patent Eligibility in
America, Part II], (questions from Senator Tillis for Rick Brandon representing the Association of
American Universities); David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
2019, 2028 (2019) (finding that “the elimination of patents would either somewhat decrease or
strongly decrease their firms’ investments in the biotechnology . . . medical device[s] . . . and
pharmaceutical industries . . . .”).
49. Peter Keeling, Mystery Solved! What is the Cost to Develop and Launch a Diagnostic?
DIACEUTICS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.diaceutics.com/?expert-insight=mystery-solved-what-isthe-cost-to-develop-and-launch-a-diagnostic [https://perma.cc/892E-GAPJ]; Athena Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1355 (Moore, J., dissenting).
50. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part III Before the Sen. Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Patent
Eligibility in America Part III] (questions for the record for Laurie Hill, Ph.D., J.D., Vice President,
Intellectual Property, Genentech, Inc.).
51. Patent Eligibility in America Part I, supra note 44 (testimony of Patrick Kilbride, Senior
Vice President of Global Innovation Policy Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
52. Patent Eligibility in America, Part II, supra note 49 (questions for Henry Hadad, President,
Intellectual Property Owners Association).
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exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” 53 The first Congress enacted the
original Patent Act in 1790 to incentivize innovation by rewarding limited
monopolies that could bring in financial gain. 54 In exchange, the invention
would be disclosed to the public domain as a resource for further scientific
advancements. 55 The system was designed to “ensure that while inventors
receive the direct benefit of their inventions in terms of capturing the
market, the research that they have done is available to others as a resource
or building block for future inventions.” 56
The Patent Act sets out the criteria necessary to obtain a patent.57 The
first criteria, laid out in 35 U.S.C. § 101, reads, “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 58 Today’s language for the § 101
patentability requirement is nearly identical to that passed in 1790. 59
However, the Supreme Court has long recognized limitations to subjectmatter eligibility beyond those explicitly set out in § 101. 60 These
judicially-created limitations stemmed from the disfavor of undue
preemption. 61 Undue preemption occurs when “a patent . . . claims a
natural principle itself or claims such a broad application of the natural
principle that there is no way to use the natural principle itself without
infringing upon the patent.” 62 In essence, undue preemption ties up future
applications and stunts scientific progress until the patent expires.
Diagnostics, by definition, is “the procedure through which the nature of
a phenomenon, such as a disease, is determined.” 63 Because IVDs are
based on natural principles, the judicially-created exceptions sow the
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109–112 (April 10, 1790); Patent Eligible Subject Matter:
Report on Views and Recommendations from the Public, USPTO (July 2017)
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-Report_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CMB-68WX].
55. Id.
56. Alexa Johnson, Note, A Crisis of Patent Law and Medical Innovation: The Category of
Diagnostic Claims in the Wake of Ariosa v. Sequenom, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 440 (2017).
57. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The criteria for
patentability established by the 1793 Act remained essentially unchanged until 1952, when Congress
amended § 101 by replacing the word ‘art’ with ‘process’ and proving in § 100(b) a definition of the
term ‘process.’”).
60. USPTO, supra note 54.
61. Johnson, supra note 57, at 440.
62. Id.
63. Diagnosis, NATURE RES., https://www.nature.com/subjects/diagnosis [https://perma.cc/
2VSK-B3KZ].

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/6

10

Iroz Rich: Treating Diagnostics

2020]

TREATING DIAGNOSTICS

699

seeds that contribute to the current problems with the unpatentability of
diagnostic testing.
A.

Early Supreme Court Jurisprudence

As early as the mid-1800s, the Supreme Court began creating judicial
exceptions to subject-matter eligibility. 64 In 1852, the Court stated that
“[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth” and “cannot be
patented” unless the principle effectuated a practical result.65 The
Supreme Court reasoned that patenting principles would “prohibit all
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.” 66
“This, by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures,
against the avowed police of the patent laws.” 67 The Supreme Court held
that patents could not be obtained for new power like steam or
electricity. 68 In the 1853 case of O’Reilly v. Morse, the Court held that
Morse was unable to patent electromagnetism because the claims were
too broad. 69 The Court expressed their worry for preemption:
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march
of science, may discover a [different] mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current . . . . But yet if it is
covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have
the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee. 70

64. USPTO, supra note 54.
65. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; and original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right. . . . In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural
agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering
them, but in applying them to useful objects.”).
66. Id. (“A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would
prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by creating
monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. (“Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to have been
generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The
same may be said of electricity, and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may
be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.”).
69. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (“If this claim can be maintained, it matters not
by what process or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know some future
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by
means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set
forth . . . . But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the
benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.”).
70. Id.
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However, the Court allowed the narrower claims tied directly to the
invention. 71 These cases were the foundation of the Court’s prohibition of
natural principles. 72
In 1873, the Supreme Court held that “a pulp suitable for the
manufacture paper, made from wood or other vegetable substances” was
unpatentable. 73 The Court reasoned that “[t]here are many things well
known and valuable in medicine or in the arts which may be extracted
from divers[e] substances. But the extract is the same, no matter from
what it is has been taken. . . . [B]ut the thing itself when obtained cannot
be called a new manufacture.” 74 In 1876, the Supreme Court first
considered patent eligibility for processes, holding that process patents
can be obtained when the process was new and useful. 75 In The Telephone
Cases, the Supreme Court found Alexander Bell’s inventions patentable
because Bell did not claim electricity in its natural state. 76
Entering into the 20th century, it was well established that natural
phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas were not patentable.77
However, diagnostic testing was in a primitive stage. 78 American
physicians were deeply skeptical of medical science, experimentation, and

71. Id. at 117 (“[F]or the particular method or process thus discovered, he is entitled to a
patent.”).
72. USPTO, supra note 54.
73. Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 594 (1874) (explaining that
an extraction is not eligible, but the process of the extraction could be patented).
74. Id.
75. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter
to be transformed and reduced to a different state of thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable
as a piece of machinery. . . . [T]he process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new
result.”).
76. Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (“In the
present case the claim is not for the use of a current of electricity in its natural state as it comes from
the battery, but for putting continuous current, in a closed circuit, into a certain specified condition
suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for that purpose.”).
77. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 505 (1874) (rejecting a patent for a rubber
head “to be attached to a pencil or something else of like character.”).
78. The beginning of modern physical diagnostic techniques began in 1761 with the discovery
of percussion, the act of tapping body parts with fingers, hands or small instruments while listening
to particular sounds within the chest cavity. In 1816, the stethoscope was invented in France. In 1871,
the thermometer was invented in Germany. See generally H. KENNETH WALKER, W. DALLAS HALL,
& J. WILLIS HURST, CLINICAL METHODS: THE HISTORY, PHYSICAL, AND LABORATORY
EXAMINATIONS ch. 1 (3rd ed. 1990) (detailing the history of diagnostic testing); Darlene Berger, A
brief history of medical diagnosis and the birth of the clinical laboratory: Part I – Ancient times
through the 19th century, AM. SOC’Y FOR CLINICAL LABORATORY SCI.–PA., https://www.asclspa.org/uploads/2/4/2/1/24211033/meddiagandlab.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZK47-LG53]
(“The
advancement of medicine . . . was more theoretical than practical [in the 18th century].”).
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laboratory sciences and disregarded these diagnostic tools. 79 It wasn’t
until the late 1800s that American physicians began to put importance on
researching diagnostics with the hope of better treatment of diseases.80
B.

Refinements of the 20th Century

The Supreme Court continued to define the limits on subject-matter
eligibility into the 20th century. In two cases from 1931 and 1948, the
Supreme Court held that natural products that did not produce a new or
distinctive property or quality were not patent eligible. 81 In American
Fruit Growers, Inc v. Brogdex Co., the Supreme Court held ineligible a
patent for treating citrus fruit with borax to make the fruit mold resistant.
The Court reasoned that the addition of the borax to the “fruit does not
produce from the raw material an article for use which possess a new or
distinctive form, quality, or property.” 82
The second case was Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 83
The Court held ineligible a combination of different bacteria strains that
increased nitrogen fixation in plants. The Court reasoned that the
combination of the two bacteria did not create something new with
distinct effects. The Court stated, “The bacteria perform[ed] in their
natural way[s]” and “[was] no more than the discovery of some of the
handiwork of nature . . . .” 84 The handiwork of nature is “part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” 85

79. WALKER et al., supra note 78, at 18 (“One estimate is that 110,000 Union soldiers died
from wounds and 225,000 from disease; 50,000 Confederate soldiers died from wounds and 150,000
from disease! Percussion was performed by only a small portion of physicians. Very few used the
thermometer. Stethoscopes were rarely used. . . . The U.S. government finally required that each
physician entering the army or navy pass a compulsory examination: barely 25% passed.”).
80. See generally id. The change came after the Civil War. American physicians travelled to
Europe to train in medicine. Upon their return, they realized the inadequacies of American medical
training. Harvard, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Johns Hopkins put emphasis on research and teaching
with the hope to develop diagnostic techniques that would influence better outcomes.
81. See Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931) (holding the patent
ineligible because there was no change in the appearance or general characteristics of the fruit that
made it new or distinctive); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)
(explaining that the discovery of bacteria inhibition properties was “no more than the discovery of
some of the handiwork of nature” and was not patentable.).
82. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
83. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. 127.
84. Id. at 131.
85. Id. at 130.
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Likewise, the Supreme Court prohibited subject-matter involving
mathematical formulas. 86 The Court explained that natural principles,
such as mathematical formulas, “cannot support a patent unless there is
some other inventive concept.” 87 If the inventive concept was intertwined
with the mathematical formula to create a structure that was novel and
useful, the patent could be eligible. 88 This translated to diagnostic testing
in 1989 when the Federal Circuit first addressed the eligibility of
diagnostic testing in In re Grams. 89 The claims in In re Grams were
directed to “[a] method of diagnosing an abnormal condition in an
individual” by performing various laboratory tests and referencing them
to a range of normal parameters. 90 The Federal Circuit held that the claim
was directed to non-statutory subject-matter because the novelty of the
invention was centered around a mathematical algorithm and was held to
be ineligible. 91
In the 1980 case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court held that if an
invention relies on a natural phenomenon, the invention must have,
“markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one
having the potential for significant utility.” 92 Likewise in 1981, Diamond
v. Diehr, the Court held that to be subject-matter eligible, the claimed
process must, “[transform] the article . . . into a different state or
thing . . . .” 93 During the Court’s analysis of the claimed invention, the
Court stressed the importance of evaluating the invention as a whole and
that it was not appropriate to dissect claims into old and new elements. 94

86. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that a method for converting binarycoded decimal signals to pure binary signals is not eligible because it is “so abstract and sweeping”);
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“While a scientific truth,
or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”).
87. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
88. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“While a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”). See also Parker, 437 U.S. at
595 (explaining a mathematical formula cannot be patented unless it is accompanied by an inventive
concept).
89. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 836–37.
91. Id. at 836.
92. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding a genetically engineered
bacterium used for oil spills patent eligible).
93. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 US 175, 184 (1981) (recognizing that the Arrhenius’s equation
alone is ineligible but the application of the Arrhenius’s equation to a process for molded synthetic
rubber was eligible).
94. Id.
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These cases signify the Court holding ineligible subject-matter that
was closely tied to a judicial exception, such as a natural product or natural
phenomenon. IVDs assess the natural relationships between diseases and
their signs or symptoms through physical examination and laboratory
techniques. 95 The Court’s holdings effectively eliminated any protections
for new biological discoveries and their connections to natural
phenomena, which are essential for diagnostic testing. Following these
cases, the Supreme Court was silent on subject-matter eligibility for
almost 30 years.
C.

Recent Supreme Court Decisions

Beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions
that radically shifted the limits of subject-matter eligibility: Bilski v.
Kappos, 96 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 97 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 98
and Alice v. CLS Bank International. 99 These four Supreme Court cases
changed the contours of the subject-matter eligibility test for natural
phenomena, natural products, and abstract ideas. In particular, Mayo and
Myriad address biological patents that changed the eligibility for natural
products. These four cases greatly impacted the subject-matter eligibility
landscape today, but caused great confusion in the legal field due to the
various interpretations of the decisions.
The first of the decisions was Bilski v. Kappos which involved a
business method for hedging risk. 100 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit used the machine-or-transformation test as an exclusive test in
evaluating the eligibility of a process. 101 The machine-or-transformation
test would allow the invention to be patent eligible when: 1) the invention
was tied to a particular machine or apparatus; and 2) the invention
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.102 The
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation

95. Diagnosis, NATURE RES., https://www.nature.com/subjects/diagnosis [https://perma.cc/
2VSK-B3KZ].
96. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010).
97. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
98. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
99. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); USPTO, supra note 54.
100. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599 (explaining the claimed invention as a way to hedge against risk of
price changes in the energy market).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 603 (describing the machine-or-transformation test).
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test as the primary factor of determining subject-matter eligibility. 103 The
Court reasoned “[s]ection 101 is a ‘dynamic provision designed to
encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’” 104 The Court continued by
explaining that “[t]echnology and other innovations progress in
unexpected way[s],” and a rigid rule would “deny patent protection for
‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . frustrat[ing] the
purposes of the patent law.” 105
Furthermore, the Court foresaw that the machine-or-transformation
test would be insufficient for inventions in the Information Age, including
inventions of advanced diagnostic medicine techniques. 106 Following
Bilski, whether diagnostic methods were patentable subject-matter
remained uncertain. 107 The Supreme Court had implied advanced
diagnostic medical techniques might be patented if they were not overly
broad preemptive claims pertaining to laws of nature. 108
In 2012, two years after Bilski, 109 the Supreme Court heard Mayo. 110
This landmark case changed the way subject-matter eligibility is analyzed.
The framework set out in Mayo is how subject-matter eligibility is
determined today for natural phenomena and natural products.111 The
patents at issue in the case claimed a process that allowed doctors to
103. See id. at 603 (“Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected way” and a rigid
rule would “deny patent protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . .
frustrat[ing] the purposes of the patent law. . . . [T]he machine-or-transformation test is a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
under § 101.”).
104. Id. at 605 (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001)).
105. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)).
106. Id.
107. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, MAYO V. PROMETHEUS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (2012).
108. THOMAS, supra note 108.
109. The day after Bilski, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for two cases: Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In both cases, the
Supreme Court immediately vacated the Federal Circuit decisions and remanded for reconsideration
based on Bilski. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services subsequently was
granted certiorari for the second time.
110. Prometheus sued Mayo Collaborative Services when they developed a similar diagnostic
test. The district court granted summary judgment for Mayo holding that the claims were directed at
natural laws or phenomena and therefore unpatentable. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed,
reasoning that the claimed processes were involved in the “transformation of the human body or of
blood taken from the body.” Petition for certiorari was granted resulting in remand in light of Bilski
which eliminated the machine-or-transformation test. The Federal Circuit again reaffirmed patent
eligibility and certiorari was granted for a second time. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76 (2012).
111. Id.
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identify metabolite levels associated with drug administration and adjust
for metabolic differences between patients. 112 The invention allowed
doctors to deliver the correct dosage of drug to each person. 113
In building an analytical framework, the Court sought to balance the
objectives of the patent system: creating limited monopolies while
promoting science. 114 Such framework “must distinguish between patents
that claim the ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ of human ingenuity and those that
integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby
‘transform[ing]’ them into a patent-eligible invention.” 115 The Court did
this by creating a two-step framework now referred to as the Alice/Mayo
test. 116 Step one requires a determination of whether the claimed invention
is directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon or product of nature,
or an abstract idea. 117 If the invention is directed towards a judicial
exception, then the question is whether the claims do “significantly more
than simply describe . . . natural relations.” 118 If the claims do
“significantly more,” the claims are eligible.
The Court concluded through the two-step analysis that the claims
were unpatentable because they claimed a natural law, the relationship
between metabolite levels and drug toxicity, without anything more. 119 If
112. Id.
113. Prometheus held patents for the use of certain drugs to treat autoimmune diseases such as
Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. Due to the metabolic differences between patients, the
effectiveness of the drug at delivery varied tremendously causing ineffectiveness or serious toxicity.
The claims allowed doctors to identify metabolic levels and adjust an individual’s drug dosage. Id.
114. Id. at 71, 85, 92 (“Patent protection is . . . a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the promise
of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery. . . .
The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle
could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. . . . The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a
concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of
nature.”).
115. Alice Corp. v. CSL Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72,
89).
116. Mayo was the first case to set out the new two-step analysis to natural laws or natural
phenomena. Two years later in Alice Corp. v. CSL Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, the Court confirmed its
holding. The technology in question in Alice was a computer-implemented process for mitigating
settlement risk. The Court extended the two-step framework to abstract ideas. However, instead of
determining whether the claims simply described the natural relation, the Courts searched for an
“inventive step.” The Court held the patent to be ineligible. Today, Alice is typically talked about in
the context of software and AI; however, it is common nomenclature to use the Alice/Mayo test to
describe § 101 eligibility.
117. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72.
118. Id. at 77.
119. Id. at 71 (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972))).
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the patent were granted, the Court reasoned that “monopolization of [these
basic] tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it.” 120 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that patents addressing the body’s natural responses should not
be granted because it would limit physicians’ access to diagnostics. 121
Myriad in 2013 had claimed isolated natural DNA associated with
increased risk of breast cancer, and synthetic DNA created from RNA.122
The Court held that while genes fell within the law of nature exception,
the question of eligibility was dependent on “markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature” 123 or if the claims added
“significantly more” as laid out in Mayo.124 In Myriad, the Court
reiterated its concern with “t[ying] up” the use of basic tools and thereby
“inhibit[ing] future innovation premised upon them.” 125 The Court held
the natural isolated DNA was not subject-matter eligible because
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” 126 Furthermore, there was nothing more
than the natural DNA. 127 The synthesized DNA, on the other hand,
differed from naturally occurring DNA, and was therefore patent
eligible. 128 The Court explicitly stated that innovative methods of
manipulating the genes could have resulted in a valid patent. 129

120. Id. (“And monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”).
121. Id. at 91 (stating that if “claims to exclusive rights over the body’s natural responses to
illness and medical treatment are permitted to stand, the result will be a vast thicket of exclusive rights
over the use of critical scientific data that must remain widely available if physicians are to provide
sound medical care.” (quoting Brief for Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 7, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. 66 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071917).
122. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 582 (2013).
123. Id. at 577 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)).
124. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 77.
125. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 589 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566
U.S. at 86) (stating that the Court has long held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and natural
ideas are not patentable because “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work” and
allowing patentability would “inhibit future innovation premised upon them.” (quoting Gottschalk v.
Benson 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
126. Id. at 591.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 594.
129. Id. at 595.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/6

18

Iroz Rich: Treating Diagnostics

2020]

TREATING DIAGNOSTICS

707

IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF CHAOS
A.

The Aftermath of the Mayo

The Court’s decision in Mayo and Myriad elicited a variety of
responses. Some scholars praised the opinions as protecting “patient care
and innovative medical research.” 130 Some in the biotechnology industry
claimed that “potentially every patent in biotechnology is not valid
because most use ‘natural processes’” 131 and that the decisions “called
into doubt innumerable biotech patents.” 132 Others criticized the Court for
not providing more guidance on what a patentable natural law looked like
and predicted the uncertainty would discourage investment and progress
in diagnostics. 133
Former Chief Judge Paul R. Michel of the Federal Circuit
characterized the effects of the Alice/Mayo framework as “unending
chaos” that has created “[u]ncertainty, unpredictability, [and] inconsistent
results and undue and harmful exclusions of new technologies . . . .” 134 He
was right. From July 2014 to June 2019, 838 patent claims were brought
in the federal courts. 135 Sixty-two percent were found to be ineligible
under § 101. 136
Mayo and the subsequent confirmation in Alice, was understood to
be applicable to natural phenomena, natural laws, and abstract ideas.137
130. AMA Welcomes Supreme Court Decision to Throw Out Prometheus Patents, HEALTH
NEWS
DIG.
(Mar.
20,
2012)
http://www.healthnewsdigest.com/news/Legal_370/
AMA_Welcomes_Supreme_Court_Decision_to_Throw_Out_Prometheus_Patents_printer.shtml
[https://perma.cc/J9ME-E627].
131. THOMAS, supra note 108, at 9 (quoting Jeffrey L. Fox, Industry Reels as Prometheus Falls
and Myriad Faces Further Reviews, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 373, 373 (2012)).
132. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Biotechnology Innovation Org. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3, Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No.
2017-2508)).
133. THOMAS, supra note 108 (citing Jeffrey L. Fox, Industry Reels as Prometheus Falls and
Myriad Faces Further Reviews, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 373, 373 (2012)).
134. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44 (statement of former Chief Justice Paul
Michel, Federal Circuit).
135. Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years of Case Law
Since Alice v. CLS Bank: Part I, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2019/08/29/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-analyzing-five-years-of-case-law-since-alice-v-clsbank-part-i/id=112722/ [https://perma.cc/2ENR-6ZSU].
136. Id.
137. Id.; Kevin Madagan & Adam Mossoff, Five Years Later, the U.S. Patent System is Still
Turning Gold to Lead, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2019/12/15/five-years-later-the-us-patent-system-is-still-turning-gold-to-lead/id=116984/
[https://perma.cc/8TUP-DVKD] (“Under the Alice/Mayo framework, courts continue to invalidate
patents securing the fruits of inventive labors in medical diagnostic tests, medical treatment methods,
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The four categories listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101: processes, machines,
manufacturing, and compositions of matter, have historically been held
eligible. 138 However, the uncertainty of § 101 has leaked into these
areas. 139 For example, the Federal Circuit ruled a garage door opener
operated by a wireless transmitter to be abstract and ineligible. 140 The
Federal Circuit held that the software-based method of operating an oildrilling rig is an abstract idea. 141 In October 2019, the Federal Circuit
shocked the patent community when it held ineligible a “method for
manufacturing driveline propeller shafts 142 with liners that are designed to
‘attenuat[e] . . . vibrations transmitted through a shaft assembly’” because
it was directed to a natural law. 143
The various interpretations of the Mayo framework have caused
uncertainty to the biotech industry and the diagnostic field. Healthcare
related technologies including diagnostic testing bear the brunt of the
consequences. 144 Since Mayo, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has not held a single diagnostic test to be subject-matter eligible. 145
District Courts are following the Federal Circuit’s lead. 146 Indeed, the

medical devices, and in high-tech inventions. . . . But the patent ineligibility contagion is
spreading . . . .”).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
139. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 137 (“Courts have invalidated patents covering methods
of using garage door openers and operating oil derricks as allegedly claiming abstract ideas or laws
o[f] nature.”).
140. Chamberlain Grp. v. Techtronic Indus., 935 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[W]e
conclude that [the patent] are directed to an abstract idea and therefore patent-ineligible.”).
141. TDE Petroleum Data Sols, Inc. v. AKM Enters, Inc., 657 F. App’x 991, 992 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
142. Propeller shafts (“propshafts”) are used to transmit rotary power in a driveline. See Am.
Axle & Mfg. v. Neapco Holdings, 939 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
143. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,774,911) (holding that the invention ineligible because it
claimed an application of the laws of thermodynamics). See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 137.
144. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 137.
145. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim in every
case before us ineligible.”).
146. Id. at n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing the district courts who are holding diagnostic tests
to be ineligible). See, e.g., Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 925 (N.D. Cal.
2018); Genetic Veterinary Scis., Inc. v. LABOklin GmbH & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va.
2018); Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd. v. Praxair Distribution., No. 15-170-GMS, 2017 WL
3867649 (D. Del. Sept. 5, 2017); Esoterix Genetic Labs. LLC v. Qiagen Inc., No. 14-cv-13228-ADB,
2016 WL 4555613 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2016); Esoterix Genetic Labs. LLC v. Qiagen Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 3d 349 (D. Mass. 2015); Genetic Veterinary Scis., Inc. v. Canine EIC Genetics, LLC, 101 F.
Supp. 3d 833 (D. Minn. 2015).
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critics of Mayo correctly predicted the per se ineligibility rule of
diagnostic tests that would proceed from the Supreme Court’s holding. 147
The consequences of a per se ineligibility rule for diagnostics is
spiraling. Paul Michel, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, and
David Kappos, former Director of the USPTO wrote:
This uncertain patent climate has a chilling effect on innovation in
biosciences to the detriment of public health. . . . [I]nvestors are less
interested in funding costly new biomarker diagnostic research. As a
result, diseases will go undiagnosed, and patients will suffer the
consequences. . . . Investment in diagnostics goes to the core of
containing spiraling health care costs, improving patient outcomes and
treating illnesses before they become debilitating to suffering
Americans. 148

Reform of § 101 is vital to the future of U.S. innovation and health
care. In an article, Kevin Madigan and Adam Mossoff emphasized the
impacts will be felt for a long time because “Section 101 confusion . . .
affects investment decisions made in long time-horizon R&D
programs . . . . These R&D programs are measured in decades.” 149 With
the IVD industry, that has a significant impact on individuals, public
health, the economy, and costs of healthcare, it is imperative to find
alternative legal solutions to protect these life-saving technologies. 150
However, the efforts of the USPTO, alongside a divided Federal
Circuit have not yielded change. Congress is in the best position to change
the law and assure the overarching policies are met. 151 But the Senate
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Intellectual Property proposed
draft legislation that could not reach a consensus across the industries
affected. Therefore, for IVDs to be patentable, Congress needs an
alternative legislative solution that finds balance between access and
return on investment.
147. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1354 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“We have turned Mayo
into a per se rule that diagnostic kits and techniques are ineligible.”).
148. David J. Kappos & Paul R. Michel, Supreme Court Patent Decisions are Stifling Health
Care
Innovation, MORNING
CONSULT
(Oct.
29,
2018,
5:00
AM
ET),
https://morningconsult.com/opinions/supreme-court-patent-decisions-stifling-health-careinnovation/ [https://perma.cc/Y6D5-XRYE].
149. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 137.
150. Kappos & Michel, supra note 147.
151. Andrew Berks & Gene Quinn, How Misaligned Incentives Are Now Killing Us,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/01/how-misaligned-incentivesare-now-killing-us/id=120312/ [https://perma.cc/PRJ3-5CX8] (“[T]he courts are really not in a
position to determine overarching policy, although they have certainly tried in this area—and
failed. . . . Policy arguments frequently fail to persuade courts. That is why the Constitution gives
Congress the power to enact legislation where the courts go astray.”).
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USPTO Efforts

The United States Trademark and Patent Office (USPTO),
promulgates the Constitution’s words by “promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for a limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 152 The USPTO’s statutory mandate allows for the
“[establishment of] regulations” to “facilitate and expedite the processing
of patent[s].” 153
The USPTO has expressed major concerns with the current state of
§ 101 subject-matter eligibility. It has been difficult to “[p]roperly apply[]
the Alice/Mayo test in a consistent manner.” 154 The inconsistency has
caused “unique challenges for the USPTO, which must ensure that its
more than 8500 patent examiners and administrative patent judges apply
the Alice/Mayo test in a manner that produces reasonably consistent and
predictable results across applications, art units and technology fields.” 155
Furthermore, “it has become difficult in some cases for inventors,
businesses, and other patent stakeholders to reliably and predictably
determine what subject-matter is patent-eligible.” 156
To alleviate the inconsistencies and unpredictability in subjectmatter eligibility, the USPTO periodically releases revised guidelines
based on new precedent from the courts for determining subject-matter
eligibility. 157 The USPTO released guidelines related to subject-matter
eligibility in January 2019 and October 2019, with the goal to “improve
the clarity, consistency, and predictability of actions across the
USPTO.” 158
The “2019 Revised Patent Subject-Matter Eligibility Guidance”
primarily focus on the proper scope and application of the abstract idea
exception particularly in the realm of software and artificial
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. See also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR8A-HKJ7].
153. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(C) (2018).
154. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/358N-D4J3]; 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50; May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,381 (May 6, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/6VMY-7MPU]; July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80 Fed. Reg.
45,429 (July 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/VPF6-Y7YJ]; 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014) [https://perma.cc/8LGX-ZS8F].
158. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50; October 2019
Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942.
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intelligence. 159 However, because natural laws and abstract ideas both rely
on the Alice/Mayo framework, these guidelines also apply to claims
directed to natural laws or phenomenon of nature. 160 The 2019 Guidelines
made two changes to examination: 1) dividing abstract ideas into
subcategories, and 2) “clarifying that a claim is not ‘directed to’ a judicial
exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application
of that exception.” 161 In the October 2019 supplement to the revised
guidance, the USPTO released a list of examples illustrating the new
examination procedures and major eligibility cases from the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit. 162
The efforts of the USPTO to create consistency are ineffective for
diagnostic testing for two reasons. First, “[t]he backbone of diagnostics is
the recognition of a relationship between a biomarker, a level of a
chemical, etc., and a disease state, efficacy, etc.” 163 The ability to
transform this relationship into a novel application or method is difficult
because “[n]ew diagnostics are often the product of a new
understanding . . . not necessarily dependent on new test methods.” 164
Therefore, the revision of examiner guidelines does not alleviate the
underlying “flawed and confusing jurisprudence and analytic[al]
frameworks.” 165
Second, the Federal Circuit disregards guidance from the USPTO
and the USPTO lacks “substantive rule-making authority” leaving
patentability up to chance in subsequent legal battles. 166 During the
process of discovery, “[i]nnovators track closely any guidance or direction
from the USPTO with respect to what products are eligible for patents.” 167
For example, the Cleveland Clinic, in developing a diagnostic test for
cardiovascular disease, carefully followed the 2016 examination
159. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“In particular,
stakeholders have expressed concern with the proper scope and application of the ‘abstract idea’
exception.”).
160. See supra Part III(C).
161. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50.
162. October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942.
163. Brian R. Dorn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Year Later, 4 ACS MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY
LETTERS 572, 572 (2013).
164. Id. at 573.
165. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44, at 30 (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson,
Former USPTO Director).
166. Id.
167. Patent Eligibility in America, Part III, supra note 50 (statement of Peter O’Neill, Executive
Director, Cleveland Clinic Innovations) (“[T]he USPTO is the federal entity that provides guidance
on patentable subject matter and issues patents. Innovators track closely any guidance or direction
from the USPTO with respect to what products are eligible for patents.”).
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guidelines to obtain patent protection. 168 In 2019, these patents that
complied with the USPTO guidelines were later challenged and
invalidated by the Federal Circuit.169 The Federal Circuit in its opinion
stated:
While we greatly respect the [US]PTO’s expertise on all matters relating
to patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its
guidance. And, especially regarding the issue of patent eligibility and
the efforts of the courts to determine the distinction between claims
directed to natural laws and those directed to patent-eligible applications
of those laws, we are mindful of the need for consistent application of
our case law. 170

However, there is not consistency in the application of the case law
in the Federal Circuit or between the USPTO and the Federal Circuit.
Rather than an issued patent “represent[ing] the approval of the federal
government that a product meets the standards of the federal statute, [it is]
the beginning of a protracted legal battle.” 171 The inconsistency creates
confusion for patent holders and investors in technologies and stifles
research and development of life-saving technologies. 172 As long as the
courts continue to give no standing to the USPTO, the unpredictability
and inconsistency will continue. 173 Congress needs to step in to resolve
the dissonance between the USPTO and the courts.

168. Id.
169. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. App’x 1013, 1020
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Patent Eligibility in America, Part III, supra note 50 (statement of Peter O’Neill, Executive
Director, Cleveland Clinic Innovations) (“A patent issued by USPTO should represent the approval
of the federal government that a product meets the standards of the federal statute, not the beginning
of a protracted legal battle.”).
172. Id. (statement of Peter O’Neill, Executive Director, Cleveland Clinic Innovations) (“The
resources for [bringing a new health care product to market] generally come from outside . . . working
with the investment community. That investment community takes into account a number of factors
when deciding whether to support commercialization – including whether a product is likely to be
able to acquire intellectual property protections, like patents.”).
173. Id. (statement of Peter O’Neill, Executive Director, Cleveland Clinic Innovations) (“These
questions about patents hurt the ability of . . . innovators to bring new products to market that involve
the life sciences. . . . [The Cleveland Clinic] ha[s] an established process to assess inventions, based
on their likelihood to be able to be developed into commercial products. Ability to get protectable
intellectual property . . . is the first, and most influential factor . . . . If an invention can’t get
intellectual property protection, usually that is a fatal flaw and the invention is abandoned at that
point.”).
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A Split Federal Circuit

Following the Alice/Mayo framework, the general consensus was
that the courts would clarify subject-matter eligibility. 174 In particular, the
Federal Circuit was in the best position to clarify the Alice/Mayo
framework due to its nationwide jurisdiction on patent law. 175 Between
July 2014 and June 2018, the federal courts issued 692 decisions applying
the Alice/Mayo framework. 176 The district courts invalidated these patents
on 101 grounds 60.8 percent of the time. 177 The Federal Circuit
invalidated 87.5 percent of its cases. 178 The Federal Circuit judges are
increasingly criticizing the § 101 framework. One Federal Circuit judge
called the patent eligibility law “incoherent” and explained that, “[t]he
law . . . renders it near impossible to know with any certainty whether the
invention is or is not patent eligible.” 179
The uncertainty regarding patent eligibility, particularly in the
biotechnology and diagnostic fields, can be seen through splits in the
Federal Circuit. 180 This deep divide was recently illustrated in the denial
of an en banc rehearing of Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services in July 2019. 181 The 7-5 order denying the rehearing was
approximately 82 pages, consisting of four separate concurrences and four
separate dissents. 182 The length and number of opinions itself exhibits the
rift in § 101 law and the need for clarification. 183

174. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44, at 4 (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson,
Former USPTO Director).
OF
APPEALS
FOR
THE
FED.
CIR.,
175. Court
Jurisdiction,
U.S. CT.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/R973-HHTB] (“As of FY
2018, the [Federal Circuit’s] jurisdiction consists of administrative law cases (20%), intellectual
property cases (67%), and cases involving money damages against the United States government
(13%). . . . Nearly all of the intellectual property cases involve patents originating from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office and all U.S. District Courts.”).
176. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44, at 5 (statement of Adam Mossoff,
Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University).
177. Id. (statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George
Mason University).
178. Id. (statement of Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George
Mason University).
179. Interval Licensing v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J.,
dissenting).
180. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1353,
(Fed. Cir. 2019); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
181. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1353.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Athena v. Mayo dealt with the diagnostic test that confirms MG, as it
did for Alison. 184 The majority wished to “write on a clean slate,” but felt
bound by Mayo. 185 The minority believed the case was distinguishable
from Mayo. 186 The dissent expressed concerns that the overbroad
interpretation of Mayo created a per se ineligibility rule for diagnostic
testing that stunts research and development of life-saving
technologies. 187
All 12 judges agreed that the current framework was “problematic”
for diagnostic patents and denied patent protection for “essential life
saving inventions.” 188 The judges “welcome[d] further explication of
eligibility standards in the area of diagnostic patents,” either by the
Supreme Court or Congress. 189 Acknowledging that § 101 issues cannot
be fixed by the Federal Circuit, the judges called for “clarification by [a]
higher authority, perhaps by Congress” to address § 101 issues that lay
“beyond the power of [the Federal Circuit].” 190
D.

A Sleeping Supreme Court

In January 2020, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari
for Athena v. Mayo against the pleas of the Solicitor General, Federal
Circuit, and numerous amici. 191 The Supreme Court also denied four other
petitions relating to patent eligibility, bringing the overall count of denied
petitions on subject-matter eligibility to over 48 since Alice in 2014. 192
With the inaction of the Supreme Court, a fix of § 101 rests squarely on
the shoulders of Congress.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 1335 (Lourie, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1352 (Moore, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1354.
188. Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring).
189. Id.
190. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Lourie, J.,
concurring) (“However, I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by
Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider are § 101 problems. . . .
Section 101 issues certainly require attention beyond the power of this court.”). See also Patent
Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44, at 30 (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Former USPTO
Director).
191. Sherry Knowles, Reflections on Denial of Cert in Athena Diagnostics, IPWATCHDOG (Jan.
20,
2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/20/reflections-denial-cert-athenadiagnostics/id=118025/ [https://perma.cc/ZW3C-JMAJ].
192. Gene Quinn, The Supreme Court is More Interested in Being Right Than Shedding Light
on 101, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/14/supreme-courtinterested-right-shedding-light-101/id=117822/ [https://perma.cc/YMH6-H44R].
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The Proposed Congressional Fix: Eliminate Everything

In February of 2019, the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property was revived for the first time since 2007 because
of a “need to reform our nation’s complicated patent process . . . .” 193 The
first priority for the subcommittee was to search for a solution for § 101
patent eligibility issues. 194 In April 2019, the subcommittee released a §
101 patent reform framework. 195 In May 2019, the subcommittee released
the draft legislation of a revised § 101 of the Patent Act. 196
One of the provisions stated, “No implicit or other judicially created
exceptions to subject-matter eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws
of nature,’ or ‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine patent
eligibility under section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting
those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.” 197 At first glance,
the draft legislation was a win for IVD testing. The abrogation of laws of
nature and natural phenomena broadened patentable subject-matter,
opening a door for IVD testing to be patented. 198 However, the abrogation
would also erase nearly 200 years of Supreme Court precedent. 199 With
the broadening of patentable subject-matter, safeguards against abuse of
the system would be replaced by patent thickets to shield competition and
the building blocks needed for scientific advancements would be
monopolized. 200

193. Eileen McDermott & Gene Quinn, As Momentum for a 101 Fix Builds on Capitol Hill, A
Look at the Revived Senate IP Subcommittee’s Leadership, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/26/momentum-101-fix-builds-capitol-hill-look-revivedsenate-ip-subcommittees-leadership/id=106690/ [https://perma.cc/TZP6-2Z27]; 101 Framework,
supra note 21 (“Senator Coons and I requested to reinstate the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on IP
because we saw a need to reform our nation’s complicated patent process, starting with section 101.”).
194. 101 Framework, supra note 21 (“Senator Coons and I requested to reinstate the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on IP because we saw a need to reform our nation’s complicated patent
process, starting with section 101.”).
195. Id.
196. Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft
Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act, THOM TILLIS U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C. (May 22,
2019) [hereinafter Draft Bill Text], https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-andreps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act
[https://perma.cc/XQN3-BPYY].
197. Id.
198. Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44 (questions for the Record for Professor
Mark A. Lemley).
199. Id. (questions for the Record for Professor Mark A. Lemley).
200. Patent Eligibility in America, Part II, supra note 49 (responses from Jeffrey K. Francer,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Association for Accessible Medicines at 3, 5) (explaining
that abuses of the system could include creating patent thickets, shielding brand-name drugs from
generic and biosimilar competition, and increasing cost of healthcare for patients and the public);
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In June 2019, the subcommittee held three days of hearings to,
“solicit additional stakeholder feedback and to hear from a diverse set of
witnesses on the problems different industries are facing with our nation’s
patent eligibility laws.” 201 While the majority of stakeholders expressed a
need for change to the eligibility framework, no consensus was met. 202 On
one extreme, stakeholders lobbied for the elimination of all exceptions. 203
On the other extreme, stakeholders lobbied for Congress to leave the
exceptions alone. 204
Senator Tillis in an interview in January 2020 said:
Given the reasonable concerns that have been expressed about the draft
as well as the practical realities of the difficulty of passing legislation,
absent stakeholder consensus I don’t see a path forward for producing a
bill—much less steering it to passage—in this Congress . . . . If we’re
going to get anything done on this issue, everyone will have to
compromise. Anything less than that is dead on arrival. 205

The way forward for a workable patent system for IVD testing must find
a middle ground that balances a limited monopoly that produces a return
on investment without stifling access to scientific building blocks needed
to make medical advancements.
V. CARVING OUT MIDDLE GROUND: A DIAGNOSTIC TEST PATENT ACT
Congress needs to develop patentability standards that would “permit
patenting of essential life saving inventions [like IVDs] based on natural
laws.” 206 These standards would need to use reasonable and measured
safeguards to balance the monetary benefits of monopolies against access
to the medical science needed to advance life-saving diagnostics.
To achieve this balance, Congress should create a diagnostic patent
act to allow the patentability of IVD tests. The proposed diagnostic patent
act would allow products of nature or natural phenomenon to be patented
Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, supra note 44 (Questions for the Record for Mr. Robert A.
Armitage).
201. Draft Bill Text, supra note 195.
202. Eileen McDermott, U.S. Companies and Groups to Congress: The Section 101 Reform
(June
26,
2019),
Draft
is
Good
and
Genes
are
Safe,
IPWATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/26/us-companies-groups-congress-101-draft-good-genessafe/id=110717/ [https://perma.cc/RY3X-TJQ6].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Quinn, supra note 22.
206. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (Hughes, J., concurring).
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but would include safeguards to allow adequate access to fundamental
research while incentivizing return on investment to the patent holder.
Safeguards to prevent tying up future inventions and negatively impacting
patient care would be included as exceptions to patent infringement claims
and compulsory licensing requirements under certain conditions.
Exceptions, which limit infringement liability to third parties in specific
situations, would be used for narrow experimental use and mandatory
processes required to comply with federal regulations. Compulsory
licensing, which requires patent holders to allow third parties to use a
patent in certain circumstances in exchange for a determined fee, would
be permitted when a patent holder acts in an anti-competitive way to
restrict access and for governmental or public health uses. The
combination of these limitations on a patent holder’s exclusive monopoly
will ensure that access to research is available while patent holders are
adequately incentivized to develop IVDs.
A.

Creating special eligibility standards for diagnostic testing

Historically, products of nature and natural phenomena have never
been patent eligible. 207 However, in 1930, Congress passed the Plant
Patent Act (PPA), which gave patent protection to new plants variations,
a product of nature. Prior to the passing the PPA, the general consensus
was that plants were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as products of
nature. 208 The PPA bypassed the § 101 requirements by allowing
patentability under certain conditions. 209 The Supreme Court explained in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
Prior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from patent
protection. The first was the belief that plants, even those artificially
bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law . . . . In
enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress . . . explained at length its belief
that the work of the plant breeder ‘in aid of nature’ was patentable
invention. 210

207.
208.

See supra Part III.
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE – SPECIAL REPORT 71 (1989) https://ota.fas.org/reports/8924.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3RL-R7L2].
209. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any
distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
210. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980).
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Congress should likewise create a separate patent act for IVD testing that
would allow patent protection for those products of nature or natural
phenomenon that are made artificially or with the assistance of science.
The other requirements of novelty, anticipation, and written description
that apply to utility patents would be applied as normal.
The challenges causing Congress to carve out separate eligibility
standards for plants are similar to the challenges that IVD testing faces
today. Plant varieties play an important role in the development of
agriculture. 211 Historical events and the growing agricultural industry
demanded “new disease-resistant, cold-tolerant, drought-tolerant, or
medicinal varieties.” 212 Yet, plant breeders and nurseries could not legally
protect their inventions and discoveries.213 Furthermore, “financial
incentives . . . to develop new varieties were inadequate to recover
research and development costs and earn a sufficient profit.”214 Plant
breeders could not “capture legal and economic control over ‘their’
[inventions and discoveries].” 215
Likewise, diagnostic testing plays an important role in the economy
and public health. 216 Diagnostic testing contributes to the economy, has
the potential to decrease chronic disease; allows for earlier interventions;
and most importantly saves lives. 217 Although there is a need for new,
efficient diagnostic testing for novel and preexisting illnesses, the current
patent system has not provided adequate incentive to invent IVDs. 218 By
excepting diagnostic patents from the judicially made subject-matter
eligibility requirements, a diagnostic testing patent law can balance
incentivization with access while addressing the concerns specific to the
diagnostic industry.
B.

Creating infringement limitations on the owner’s monopoly to
promote further medical research and advancements

Patent schemes can allow third parties to use patented technology
without the authorization of the patent holder in specific scenarios. 219
211. CONGRESS, supra note 207.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of Its Creation, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 621, 640 (2000).
216. See supra Part II.
217. See supra Part II.
218. See supra Part II.
219. Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses:
Options for Developing Countries 7 (Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, Trade-Related Agenda, Dev.
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These exceptions are limited circumstances in which the exclusive rights
of the patent holder may be narrowed. 220 When circumstances are met,
use of a patented invention is automatically granted to a third party
without the authorization of the patent holder. 221 The third party
technically infringes on the patent but the law does not afford remedies to
the patent holder in these situations. 222 Examples of exceptions that limit
infringement liability include: experimental or education use; prior use;
acts for non-commercial or non-profit making purposes; preparations of
prescribed drugs; compliance with federal regulations; and medical
treatment exceptions to name a few. 223
Exceptions are important to include in a diagnostic patent act to
address the concerns with access to diagnostic tools, cost for general
public, and public health. Exceptions mitigate the liability of accessing
the patents in certain circumstances, allowing research to move forward
and competition that influences the cost to the general public and quality
of tests available.
Because exceptions limit the a patent holder’s exclusive rights
granted by the patent, exceptions must be reasonable and measured. 224
Article 30 of the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) sets out a “three-step test” for determining the
validity of an exceptions: (1) be limited in scope, (2) not “unreasonably
conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent,” and (3) not
“unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” 225
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has defined limited scope as
“one which makes only a small diminution of the rights in question” or
narrowly binds the unauthorized use of the patent. 226 The limited scope
and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Paper No. 5, 1999) (Apr. 25, 2000) https://www.iatp.org/
documents/intellectual-property-rights-and-the-use-of-compulsory-licenses-options-for-developingcou [https://perma.cc/QX5P-WYXB].
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Experts Study on Exclusions from Patentability
and Exceptions and Limitations to Patentees’ Rights, Annex I at 29–30, WIPO doc. SCP/15/3 (Sept.
2, 2010) [hereinafter Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex I].
224. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 30, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
225. The TRIPS agreement governs intellectual property rights of Member States of the World
Trade Organization. Id.
226. Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex I, supra note 222, at 37 (quoting Panel Report,
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶¶ 7.30, 7.44, WTO Doc. WT/DS 114/R
(adopted Mar. 17, 2000)).
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analysis is not based on the economic impact of the exception nor the
number of rights infringed upon, but the impact on the exclusive rights
itself. 227 For example, a Canadian “stockpile exception” which allowed
manufacturing of a drug prior to the expiration of a patent was not
considered limiting because it “abrogated the patentee’s rights to make
and use the invention entirely during the [last] six months.” 228
When determining the second-step of “unreasonable conflict” with
“normal exploitation”, WTO looks at how the patent holder would extract
economic value from the patent in its commercial industry. 229 Finally, in
determining the legitimate interests of the patent owner and third parties,
WTO looks not at the legal interests, but the justifiable interests of the
patent holder and third parties supported by “public polic[y] or other
social norms.” 230
Using the TRIPS “three-step test,” two exceptions should be
included in a diagnostic testing act: (1) the Bolar exception that allows for
earlier approval of IVDs by federal regulatory agencies to occur without
the risk of an infringement action; and (2) a narrow experimental use
exception that provides limited access to the IVD patent.
1. The Bolar Exception
Section 271(e)(1) of the Hatch-Waxman Act states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . . 231

This limitation of liability is referred to as the Bolar exemption. 232
The Bolar exception allows for unauthorized use of a patent in order to
obtain regulatory approval. This exception is commonly used by generic
drug companies wanting to put a competing product on the market once
the patent covering the brand drug expires. However, in order to
commercialize a drug, Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval
requires trials to be done with the patented drug to show

227. Id.
228. Id. (citing WT/DS 114/R, ¶¶ 7.30, 7.44).
229. Id. at 38.
230. Id. (quoting WT/DS 114/R, ¶ 7.69).
231. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
232. Anthony Tridico, Jeffrey Jacobstein & Leythem Wall, Facilitating Generic Drug
Manufacturing: Bolar Exemptions Worldwide, WIPO MAG., June 2014, at 17–20.
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bioequivalence. 233 If the process started as soon as the patent expired, no
competition would exist until approval was granted which could be years,
effectively giving the patent holder a longer monopoly on the product.
The Bolar exception corrects this abuse by allowing use in relation to
federal regulations.
IVDs, like pharmaceuticals, are also subject to FDA approval. 234
Therefore, to ensure the monopoly a patented IVD is terminated at
expiration, a Bolar exception must be included in a diagnostic patent act.
This exception would encourage competition and likewise benefit the
general public with access and options to a variety of diagnostic tests.
2. Experimental Use Exceptions
“The purpose of an experimental use exception should be to protect
the patentee’s ability to recoup her research and development investment
while preventing her from using her exclusive rights to exercise
unwarranted control over subsequent innovation.” 235 In other words, an
experimental use exception allows the non-patent holder to experiment
with the patent in order to understand the science and mechanism and
invent subsequent improvements without infringement liability. An
experimental use exception provides the scientific community access to
build upon.
A narrow experimental use exception for diagnostic patents should
be included in a legislative framework. Three contours define the scope
of the exception: 1) the meaning of “experimental,” 2) whether the use
extends to use “with” or “on” the patented invention, and 3) whether the
experimental use can be used for commercial activity.236
The meaning of “experimental” needs to be “very narrow and strictly
limited.” 237 Experimental use would not include commercial use or
“furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” for two

233. Id.
234. The Supreme Court in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences Ltd., interpreted § 271(e)(1)
broadly, allowing use of a patented technology, not just pharmaceuticals, to develop and submit to
the FDA. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005).
235. Katherine Strandburg, What does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 100.
236. Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex I, supra note 222, at 39.
237. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Federal Circuit held in
2002 that the experimental use exception for patents is restricted to non-commercial use. Id. at 1362.
The patent owner sued Duke University for using equipment that he held the patent to. Id. at 1352–
53. The Federal Circuit reasoned that because Duke University had a commercial interest tied to its
reputation as a research facility the experimental exception did not apply. Id. at 1362–63.
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reasons. 238 First, the interests of a patent holder is to exploit IVD patent
commercially to make a gain on investment. Without restricting
experimental use exception to non-commercial purposes, third parties
could use the experiment use exception as a guise to commercialize the
IVD patent. This would unreasonably conflict with the patent holder’s
commercialization and return on investment, thereby destroying the
patent holder’s exclusivity of the rights and significantly undermine the
expected return on investment for the patent holder.
Second, higher education institutions, which are often included in
experimental use exceptions, are incubators for commercialized
biotechnology and would undermine return on investment. Universities
and their laboratories are increasingly partnered with biotech companies
who “collaborate with universities by building laboratories, conducting
research, and obtaining licenses to the patents obtained. 239 Companies
look to research universities as “sources of new technologies.” 240 “In 2017
alone, America’s universities were granted more than 6800 patents,
created over 1000 startup companies, produced many new medical
breakthroughs, and generated millions of dollars of economic benefit for
the country.” 241 Therefore, by allowing commercial use without
infringement liability, the patent holder would not receive adequate return
on investment.
Additionally, the scope of the experimental use exception would
need to be limited to experiments on the patented IVD rather than with the
patented IVD. To experiment on an IVD patent would be to examine the
invention itself through recreation. To experiment with an IVD patent
would be to use it as a research tool without compensation to the patent
holder. If research tools, such as diagnostic test patents, were allowed to
be experimented with without payment a patentee would have no
incentive to invest it its creation.242 Furthermore, allowing
experimentation or research with would “greatly ease the ability of
competitors to ‘design around’ the invention or develop competing
technologies” which would also strip the return on investment from

238. Id. at 1362.
239. Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is it Time for Compulsory
Licensing of Biotech Tools, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351, 404–05 (2005).
240. Id.
241. Patent Eligibility in America, Part II, supra note 49 (questions from Senator Tillis for Rick
Brandon representing the Association of American Universities).
242. Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex I, supra note 222, at 39.
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research and development from the patent holder and discourage future
investment. 243
Opponents of a narrow experimental use exception generally argue
that an overly restrictive exception “might conceivably depress
technological advancement by decreasing the ability of researchers to
experiment with the state-of-the-art technology.” 244 This is true for
diagnostic tools; life science research is often cumulative and the results
of collaboration. 245 Without access to the patented invention, further
research and development that could lead to medical treatments and other
advancements could be stifled.246 Therefore, in a legislative framework
for diagnostic test patents, it is imperative that authorization for
experimental use with the patent for commercial activities be subject to
compulsory licensing.
C.

Protecting Return on Investment and Granting Access through
Compulsory Licensing

Like exceptions, compulsory licenses limit the exclusive rights of
patent owners. 247 The difference is that “a government allows someone
else to produce a patented product or process without the consent of the
patent owner or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself.” 248
Compulsory licensing can be used “as a legal measure against patent
abuse and public health problems . . . .” 249 “The provision of compulsory
licenses” is a crucial element in a health-sensitive patent law—such
licenses may constitute “an important tool to promote competition . . .
while ensuring that the patent owner obtains compensation for the use of
the invention.” 250

243. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32651, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE
EXPERIMENTAL USE PRIVILEGE IN PATENT LAW 9–10 (2004).
244. Id. at 2 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989)).
245. Alexis K. Juergens & Leslie P. Francis, Protecting essential information about genetic
variants as trade secrets: A problem for public policy?, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 682 (2018).
246. Id.
247. CARLOS CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (South Centre ed. 2000).
248. Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/YXT4DNAF].
249. Kyung-Bok Son, Importance of the intellectual property system in attempting compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals: A cross-sectional analysis, GLOBAL HEALTH 15, no. 42, 2019, at 2.
250. CORREA, supra note 247, at 93.
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Compulsory licensing significantly affects the right of the patent
holder to decide who to license to and under what terms.251 Therefore, it
generally occurs under exceptional circumstances. 252 The TRIPS
Agreement, Article 31, does not limit the uses of compulsory licenses but
recommends that compulsory licensing be used for emergency situations,
anti-competitive practices, public non-commercial use, and dependent
patents. 253 To be used in other circumstances, Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides a set of conditions to consider including: prior
requests, non-exclusive character of the licenses, the stipulation of
compensation based on the economic value of the license, and the
conditions for termination of the authorization. 254 These standards help
maintain a reasonable balance between the limited monopoly of the
patented invention and the promotion of science for the public good.
For example, compulsory licensing is most frequently used in the
pharmaceutical industry to promote competition and decrease drug
prices. 255 In the context of the HIV pandemic, Thailand used compulsory
licensing to enable the manufacturing of HIV drugs by third parties in
order improve accessibility and cost for the public good. 256

251. Esther van Zimmeren & Geertrui Van Overwalle, A Paper Tiger? Compulsory License
Regimes for Public Health in Europe, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 13 (Jan.
2011).
252. Id. at 16.
253. Correa, supra note 218, at 8.
254. Id.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 223; Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Experts
Study on Exclusions from Patentability and Exceptions and Limitations to Patentees’ Rights, Annex
V at 5, WIPO doc. SCP/15/3 (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex
V] (“There are certain common requirements: (a) the authorization of such use must be considered
on its individual merits; (b) such use may be permitted only if, prior to such use, the proposed user
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions, which efforts have not been successful within a reasonable time; (c) the scope and duration
of such use must be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, (d) such use must be nonexclusive; (e) such use must be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill
which enjoys such use; (f) any such use must be authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; (g) authorization for such use must be liable,
subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated
if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent
authority must have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these
circumstances; (h) the right holder must be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; (i) the legal validity of any decision
relating to the authorization of such use must be subject to judicial review, or other independent
review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; and any decision relating to the remuneration
provided in respect of such use must be subject to judicial review, or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member.”).
255. See Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex V, supra note 254.
256. Id. at 22.
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1. Compulsory licensing for diagnostic testing
Compulsory licensing is not currently used in relation to diagnostic
testing in the United States; however, compulsory licensing is suitable for
diagnostic testing. 257 Compulsory licensing is especially useful for
diagnostic test patents for two reasons. First, the public policy objectives
of compulsory licensing are to “safeguard the interest of the general
public . . . [and] ‘protect the general public from the disadvantages of the
monopoly position of a patent proprietor.’” 258 Because diagnostic testing
plays such a fundamental part in both the effectiveness of the public health
system and the advancement of public health, it cannot be completely
monopolized. 259
When patent holders refuse to grant accessibility to a life-saving
technology, compulsory licensing can be used to limit a patent owner’s
rights under those extreme circumstances. 260 Compulsory licensing can
pressure companies into engaging into licenses on their own terms before
being compelled to by the courts or an agency. 261 For example, in 2001
during the anthrax scare, the U.S. threatened to impose compulsory
licensing requirements for a drug to treat anthrax. 262 Companies
responded with price discounts and access to supplies of the drug. 263
Second, compulsory licensing “strik[es] a balance between the
interests of patentee on the one hand and of third parties and/or public
interest and/or society on the other hand.” 264 The current structure of the
patent system is unbalanced in relation to IVD diagnostics. By rewarding
exclusive control over a diagnostic patent for 20 years, advancements and
development by others may be prohibited and the public interest is
harmed. Therefore, balancing the exclusive rights of the patentee with
access to the technology through compulsory licensing is vital for a
healthy diagnostic system. Compulsory licensing gives access to others
while still rewarding the patent owner with a return on their investment
for research and development.
Opponents argue that compulsory licensing is too aggressive towards
the patentee’s rights, that compulsory licensing will “diminish[] or
257. Correa, supra note 218, at 7.
258. Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Draft Reference document on the Exception
Regarding Compulsory Licensing, Annex at 4, WIPO doc. SCP/30/3 (May 21, 2019) [hereinafter
Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing].
259. See supra Part II.
260. Cf. Zimmeren, supra note 251.
261. Id. at 27.
262. Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing, supra note 258, at 56.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 5.
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destroy[] the incentives to undertake R&D by patent holders.” 265
Furthermore, that compulsory licensing “diminish[es] the purpose of the
patent system by reducing inventors’ incentive to develop new
technologies [by] encouraging inventors to keep inventions secret.”266
However, studies have shown that there is no negative effect on R&D. 267
Contrary to common misconceptions, companies subject to compulsory
licensing had a significant rise in investment because “spend[ing] large
sums of money on efforts to ‘invent around’ the patents of their
competitors . . . would be unnecessary . . . .” 268
Opponents also argue that “compulsory licensing does not allow [a
company] to recoup any investment incurred through research and
development . . . to make a sufficient profit for them to remain in the
business” and “diminish[es] the incentives for innovati[on].” 269 Forcing a
patent holder to license his patented invention that grant him exclusive
rights to that inventions for a limited time “usurp[s] traditional patent
systems” and are “sometimes diametrically opposed to the patent
system.” 270
While compulsory licensing does limit the patent holder’s exclusive
rights, “compulsory licensing positively influence[s] the survival of
certain patents . . . because compulsory licens[es] [are] granted as an
alternative to the abolition of patents.” 271 Diagnostic testing patents are
the perfect example of compulsory licensing saving a patent as an
alternative to no patent at all. As § 101 stands currently, diagnostic testing
is per se ineligible. 272 All diagnostic tests have been invalidated at the
Federal Circuit level. 273 As of now, there is little to no incentive to invent
diagnostic tests because they are being invalidated. Without intervention,
diagnostic patents will die, alongside the people that these patents could

265. Correa, supra note 218, at 17.
266. Joseph A. Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, U.
ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (2001).
267. Correa, supra note 218, at 17; Dora Kripapuri, Comment, Reasoned Compulsory
Licensing: Applying U.S. Antitrust “Rule of Reason” to TRIP’s Compulsory Licensing Provision, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2002).
268. Correa, supra note 218, at 17 (citing Pankaj Tandon, Optimal patents with compulsory
licensing, 90 J. POLITICAL ECON. 470, 485 (1982)); Kripapuri, supra note 267.
269. Kyung-Bok Son, supra note 249, at 2.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Moore, J. dissenting).
273. Id. (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim in every single case before
us ineligible.”).
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save. Compulsory licensing creates an incentive while still protecting
rights and access to further medical advancements.
2. Conditions for Granting Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licenses are granted by a court or administration under
specific circumstances.274 Compensation is then paid to the patent
owner. 275 Compulsory licensing is a tool to grant access to scientific
research and tools where otherwise there would be no access. 276 Allowing
access to life-saving technologies lead to further medical research, prevent
anti-competitive practices, and incentivize the further medical research.277
Because of the aggressive way in which compulsory licensing limits
a patent holder’s exclusive rights, conditions for granting compulsory
licensing should be measured and reasonable against the overall
objectives of using compulsory licensing. Compulsory licenses should not
be granted as a fishing expedition to gain access to any patent. Therefore,
to prevent compulsory licensing from being abused, third parties applying
for a compulsory license should be qualified, motivated, and have the
required means to exploit the patent. 278
a. Anti-competitive practices
Creating compulsory licensing for anti-competitive practices with
diagnostic testing would not be something new. The use of compulsory
licenses to prohibit monopolies is commonly used by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). 279 For example, in 1997 the merger that created
Novartis, a biotech company, the FTC compelled licensing of a number
of healthcare related inventions to any interested party at a certain rate. 280
Extending compulsory licensing to diagnostic testing under a diagnostic
patent act would ensure that healthy competition and access to life-saving
technologies need to advance medicine.
Additionally, other countries, particularly European countries have
used compulsory licensing to combat anti-competitive practices in the
IVD testing area. Specifically, many European countries changed their
laws in response to Myriad’s restrictive licensing of the BRCA genes. 281
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Correa, supra note 218, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 26.
Correa, supra note 218, at 16.
Id.
Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 21.
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Myriad Genetics, a leading diagnostic company, held patents for the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes which are indicators for hereditary breast and
ovarian cancers. 282 They were the “sole distributors of the genetic test”
and collector of the data from the genetic testing. 283 Myriad exclusively
licensed the gene sequences to other laboratories for a select set of
mutations of the gene. 284 To obtain full analysis, Myriad would have to
carry out the sequence analysis for a steep fee.285 Because of the limited
data, patients were not obtaining accurate results and advancements to
science, including possible treatments, were stunted. 286
European countries have amended their laws to prevent
monopolization of important diagnostic testing. 287 France allows for exofficio licensing but does not include diagnostics specifically. 288
Switzerland has specific text allowing for compulsory licensing of
diagnostic products and processes. 289 The United States banned genetic
testing patents. 290
A patent owner’s refusal to deal, failure to work, and dependency
patents “may be anti-competitive when this allows a patentee to block
follow-on research, particularly if the initial patent is overly broad” or the
patentee has created a patent thicket around the technology. 291 Therefore,
under these circumstances and others that restrict access to the
technology, compulsory licensing should be available.
b. Refusal to deal
The patent owner by virtue of holding the patent can refuse to license
with a third party. 292 However, when a patent holder “refuses to grant a
voluntary license which was requested on reasonable commercial terms,”
compulsory licensing should be used. 293 Refusal to deal is often
considered in light of other factors, such as when “the availability of the
282. Juergens, supra note 245, at 686.
283. Id. at 688.
284. Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 9.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 22.
288. Id. at 23. Ex officio licensing is a mechanism that allows third parties to bypass
authorization for the patent owner and compels the owner to grant right to use the patented invention
in the interest of the public good.
289. Id.
290. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
291. Correa, supra note 218, at 10.
292. Id.
293. CORREA, supra note 247, at 98.
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patented product is negatively affected . . . , or the development of a
commercial activity [is] jeopardized” a compulsory license should be
granted. 294 Myriad’s restrictive licensing practice is an example of when
compulsory licensing would have been useful to prevent the
monopolization of a specific diagnostic test. 295 Under a compulsory
licensing regime, Myriad would have had to license its diagnostic test
under its own terms or been forced to license under the reasonable terms
of a court or administration. As a result, the public health interest would
have benefited because patients would receive full genetic results
regarding the risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer and take the
appropriate steps. 296
c. Failure to work and inadequate supply
Currently, U.S. case law dictates that a patent owner has no
obligation to use, license, or commercialize their patent. 297 However, this
is harmful to the biotech industry and consequently American lives.
Companies, especially pharmaceuticals, patent technologies for strategic
and anticompetitive behavior to “deliberately suppress products or
processes from the market to benefit financially.” 298 These strategies
abuse the system and undermine the purpose of the patent system.299
These abuses significantly affect biotech research because it is
collaborative and interconnected. 300 In terms of protecting diagnostic test
patents, it is vital that patents are not suppressed to block future
research. 301
Failure to work describes circumstances when the patent holder does
not sufficiently exploit a patent. 302 This can occur in many ways, such as:
the invention is only partially implemented; the demand for the patented
product is not being adequately met; the product is not available to the
public at a reasonable price or does not fulfill the reasonable requirements
of the public; or the quality of the product is not acceptable. 303

294. Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex V, supra note 254, at 13.
295. Juergens, supra note 245, at 688.
296. Id.
297. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
298. Neil S. Tyler, Patent Nonuse and Technology Suppression: The Use of Compulsory
Licensing to Promote Progress, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 451, 458 (2014).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 17.
303. Study of Exclusions and Exceptions, Annex V, supra note 254, at 13.
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Compulsory licensing would curb these abuses by companies patenting
technologies for the sole purpose of blocking others from using it.
The failure to work condition should be included in the diagnostic
patent act to allow access when the patent is not being worked adequately.
Allowing licensing would give others the opportunity to manufacture the
IVD test for the public good. The scope of failure to work should be
legislated with safeguards as to balance the interests of the patent holder
with the interests of a third party’s use of the invention as a public good.
First, failure to work can be defined narrowly. 304 For example, in France,
Belgium, and Switzerland, licensing to others for production is sufficient
to satisfy the working requirement and compulsory licensing cannot be
used. 305 In other countries, “non-working” or “insufficient working”
refers to an inadequate supply of product for the domestic market or
unreasonable prices. 306 Second, a time limitation should be included to
allow the patent holder sufficient time to properly exploit the patent.307
Placing a time limit would protect the patent holder’s rights in a practical
manner. Third, failure to work may provide evidentiary value to a court
reviewing a compulsory licensing motion. For example, failure to obtain
FDA approval may evince failure to work; however, if obtaining FDA
approval for a diagnostic test is impossible, the courts could deny the
compulsory license. 308 By allowing compulsory licensing for failure to
work, medical advancements could move forward for the betterment of
public health.
d. Dependent patents
Patents often build off each other in biotechnology. 309 For example,
ABC Co. has an IVD patent to diagnose an illness. XYZ Inc. has
discovered that ABC’s patent plus component B allows the diagnostic test
to be performed faster. However, without a license from ABC, XYZ
cannot commercialize its invention of component B without infringing
ABC’s patent. If ABC refuses to license, this faster technology will never
benefit the public. This is the problem of dependent patents. 310
304. Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 17.
305. Id.
306. Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing, supra note 258, at 27 (referencing responses
to a questionnaire from Burkina Faso, China, Hong Kong, Greece, Israel, Poland, South Korea, Spain,
Dominican Republic, India, and Morocco).
307. Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 17.
308. Id.
309. Ralf D. Kirsch, Claus Becker & Thomas Westphal, Dependent patent in biotechnology, 7
EURO BIOTECH NEWS 43 (2008).
310. Id.
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Dependency occurs when the use of one invention is not possible
without the infringement of another invention. 311 This typically occurs
when “the owner of a patent covering an improvement on an invention
that has already been patented by someone else may not practice its
invention without the authorization by the first patentee. 312
In diagnostic testing, patent dependency could essentially block out
a competitor from an entire field of study. This in turn would harm the
public interest. Therefore, the legislative framework should allow for
compulsory licenses to be granted when dependency occurs and the
original patentee is unwilling to negotiate reasonable terms.
e. Governmental Use or Public Health Interests
Compulsory licensing for government use occurs when the
government wants to exploit a technology of another. 313 Through eminent
domain, the government can use the patented technology in exchange for
reasonable compensation.314 A common example is the licensing of
patents for national defense purposes.
The U.S. also has created compulsory licenses when the public
interest is at stake. For example, the U.S. was going through an energy
crisis in 1973. To become energy dependent, the Federal Non-Nuclear
Energy Research and Development Act (ERDA) in 1974 allowed for
recommendations on related technology that should be compelled to be
licensed. 315
In many jurisdictions, public health is considered to be a strong
public interest. Art. 8 of the TRIPS agreement states that Member States
should “adopt measures to protect public health . . . .” 316 The World
Health Organization published a list on “essential diagnostic tests” that
improve public health in 2018. 317 Additionally, some countries consider
access to IVD tests vital to public health. 318 Belgium and Switzerland use
compulsory licensing to access genetic diagnostic testing, which they
consider a public health interest. 319
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Correa, supra note 218, at 13.
Zimmeren, supra note 251, at 17.
Correa, supra note 218, at 14.
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 223.
Essential Diagnostics, supra note 25.
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Because “public health” can be a broad swath of circumstances, it is
important to define the scope of “public health,” what conditions must be
fulfilled, and the geographical effects in order to use compulsory licensing
under a public health reason. 320 Europe gives examples of how public
health is defined for compulsory licensing. 321 France defines a public
health interest to be triggered when the quality or quantity is insufficient,
when the price is abnormally high, if the patent is being exploited contrary
to public health interests, or if a patent is being used for anti-competitive
practices. 322 Switzerland’s public health interest is triggered when
“inventions regarding diagnostic products or processes has engaged in
anti-competitive practices . . . .” 323 This includes insufficient testing
facilities or high prices that are detrimental to patient care.324
Like the European countries, a legislative framework for a diagnostic
patent act should include conditions for public health interests. The public
health definition should include circumstances of a public health crisis,
inadequate product, or when the patent is being exploits contrary to public
health interests. By allowing these circumstances, the interests of the
public as a whole are protected. The individuals who need access to new
technologies to be accurately diagnosed would have access in the case of
a public health emergency while the patent holder is being compensated.
IV. CONCLUSION
“The public interest is poorly served by adding disincentive to the
development of new diagnostic methods.” 325 Yet, the patent system and
judicially-made exceptions have disincentivized the research and
development of diagnostic tools to the detriment of the public interest.
This is not only harming medical advancements but killing people. In
2020, the world experienced a global pandemic of COVID-19. The United
States struggled to supply diagnostics tests to gauge the severity of the
outbreak, make public health decision, and manage scarce resources
within hospitals. 326 On March 12, 2020, the FDA authorized a series of
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 25.
324. Id. at 24.
325. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (Moore, J., dissenting).
326. Robert P. Baird, Why Widespread Coronavirus Testing Isn’t Coming Anytime Soon, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 24, 2020) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-widespreadcoronavirus-testing-isnt-coming-anytime-soon [https://perma.cc/3GGN-QYH2] (“The ability to test
at scale appears to have been a crucial – though far from the only – means by which China, South
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Emergency Use Authorizations for commercial test companies to
manufacture and distribute tests. It was in the middle of a global pandemic
that commercial diagnostic companies had the incentive to develop these
life-saving tests. 327 The lack of tests and the race to develop tests is a
wake-up call for the patent system. These important life-saving tests need
to be incentivized and patent protected. The patent system for IVD tests
needs to be reformed.
The current draft legislation does not properly balance the incentive
to develop IVD patents with the appropriate access as to not stunt
scientific advancements. Congress needs a middle-ground reform for
IVDs. A separate diagnostic patent act is the balance. The proposed
legislation outlined here allows for diagnostics to be patented. However,
the proposed scheme does not allow for a free for all. It limits
infringement to allow access under certain circumstances. On the other
hand, it creates a compulsory licensing to give access to the scientific
community when needed while compensating the patent holder. The
proposed scheme allows for a return on investment and incentives to
develop without locking down fundamental building blocks.
The diagnostic industry cannot stop. The proposed scheme would
allow it to continue and flourish. Diagnostic testing is too important and
impacts too many people to not protect it.

Korea, Singapore, and other countries have been able to control their epidemics . . . a comprehensive
testing program that would, ideally, allow for a more targeted strategy of contact tracing, isolation,
and quarantine.”); Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas &
Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES
(last updated Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronaviruspandemic.html [https://perma.cc/5BJ7-RNWS].
327. Megha Satyanarayana, Companies are racing to develop COVID-19 test for the U.S. Will
they help?, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS (Apr. 1, 2020) https://cen.acs.org/analyticalchemistry/diagnostics/Companies-racing-develop-COVID-19/98/i14
[https://perma.cc/NGR8EUED] (“While countries like Germany and South Korea have flattened the curve of the COVID-19
pandemic through widespread testing, the US has seen cases surge. Many blame that meteoric rise, in
part, on bottlenecks in diagnosing the novel coronavirus. To try to break this logjam, some companies
and academic groups are developing tests that exploit a variety of technologies and platforms.”).
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